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Abstract
The article focuses on the way moral pluralism is dealt with in adult religious-moral education. 
Following the philosopher N. Rescher, various angles on the diversity of moral stances are iden-
tified: nihilism, monism, scepticist pluralism, relativist pluralism, syncretist pluralism and con-
textualist pluralism. On the basis of this typology certain goals of Christian moral education for 
adults are singled out. The results of an empirical study among Christian adult educators con-
firms the fruitfulness of Rescher’s typology for describing these goals and provides pointers for 
amending them. Thus Christian adult educators combine the three pluralist goals that we dis-
cerned in a single goal, which we call a deliberative pluralist goal of moral education. This is the 
goal that educators agree with most strongly. It requires participants to learn to consider the 
various moral stances as legitimate alternatives. Agreement with the pluralist goal goes hand in 
hand with a democratic view of the church and openness to alternative beliefs and mystical 
experience.
Keywords
Christian adult education, moral pluralism, educational orientations
1. Introduction
This article deals with goals of moral education within Christian adult educa-
tion. In practice Christian adult education entails both religious and moral 
instruction. Participants are given both religious and moral education. After 
all, the Christian tradition consists not only of notions about transcendent 
reality, but also about the good life and how to realize it. In God — or some 
sort of transcendent reality — we experience what the good life is and then 
try to realize it in terms of these insights. On the basis of their view of the 
good life religions (like Christianity) offer people an orientation and 
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 inspiration when they face moral choices (Auer 1973, 123-142).1 Our concept 
of religion is based on the definition of the theologian Keith Ward, according 
to whom religion comprises “a set of practices to establish a relationship with 
a transcendent reality for the sake of obtaining human good or avoiding harm” 
(Ward 2004, 3). Religion is a practical affair, concerned with what people do 
to become better human beings:
It [religion] is essentially concerned with ways of living and acting, with commit-
ment to a specific conception of the good and to a way of life that is empowered 
by participation in that good (Ward 2004, 180).
Consequently moral education is a major component of Christian adult edu-
cation, which is what this article is about. We focus on general normative 
action orientations (values), rather than norms in the sense of more or less 
direct behavioral precepts. Our concern with moral instruction in Christian 
education stems from interest in how Christian adult educators deal with 
moral pluralism. For in modern society Christian adult education takes place 
in a pluralist setting.
Moral pluralism means that people have diverse, conflicting moral prefer-
ences, both within and between religions. They are aware of this pluralism, 
which has implications for adult moral education. It is not just a matter of 
handing down the moral tradition of Christianity. What do Christian adult 
educators want to achieve with moral education? How do they teach partici-
pants to handle moral pluralism? The practice of Christian adult education 
constantly confronts one with this situation. A Christian religious commu-
nity may, for instance, have diverse views on the accommodation of asylum 
seekers who have exhausted all legal procedures. The procedures have been 
highlighted recently by the eviction of a number of families from their 
homes. One moral stance is that such people should be accommodated in the 
homes of members of the religious community, even if it means contravening 
the law. Another moral position is that everybody should stick to the law at 
all times. Yet another view is that in such cases church asylum would be a jus-
tified exception to the rule. People deal with this diversity in various ways. 
Do they deny or accept the existence of different notions? Do they feel that 
all these views merit careful consideration? Which approach should be 
1 According to A. Auer (1973, 123-142) a Christian perspective fulfils three functions when 
it comes to morality: an integrative function in regard to different values, a stimulating function 
for positive action based on certain values, and a critical function regarding values and human 
conduct.
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accepted? Does one have to choose, and if so, on what grounds? Can the 
choice be based on rational arguments?
This article is based on a distinction made by the philosopher N. Rescher 
between positions on moral pluralism. Different positions are classified in 
terms of the extent to which one can justify one’s own moral stance. This 
results in a typology of options for dealing with moral pluralism (2). The 
typology enables us to identify different kinds of substantive goals for moral 
adult education in a religious context. Each type of goal prepares people for a 
different manner of dealing with moral pluralism (3). We then formulate 
research questions, sample and measuring instruments (4). Next, we present 
the findings of an empirical research project among Christian adult educators 
in the Catholic Church in the Netherlands (5). The article ends with conclu-
sions and a discussion of some noteworthy research results (6).
2. Typology of Responses to Moral Pluralism
Nicholas Rescher defines pluralism as “the doctrine that any substantial ques-
tion admits of a variety of plausible but mutually conflicting responses” 
(Rescher 1993, 79). In this article on moral education we interpret moral 
pluralism as a ‘substantive question’ regarding the choice of a moral stance 
(Rescher 1993, 5).2 Diversity of moral preferences raises the question of how 
to justify one’s own moral stance: how does one know or find out which 
stance to adopt? In Rescher’s view it is the one that is most justified in 
rational terms. Based on the feasibility of such justification we distinguish 
between six possible positions on moral pluralism, on the following three 
conditions:
• First, the existence of a diversity of plausible moral stances must be 
acknowledged.
• Second, one has to choose one of these stances.
• Third, the choice must be based on rational, convincing grounds.
Rescher mentions two positions that fail to satisfy the first condition. People 
occupying these positions deny the existence of a diversity of plausible 
stances. This nihilistic position rests on the assumption that in cases of moral 
uncertainty no response is possible. Hence none of the moral stances is either 
considered or accepted. In the case of a monistic stance only one perspective 
2 Rescher (1993) distinguishes between pluralism and consensus in the areas of religious 
beliefs (theoretical/cognitive), action (practical/pragmatic) and values (evaluative/axiological). 
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is considered and accepted, since it is assumed that there is only one possible 
choice. Consequently the nihilistic and monistic positions both fail to meet 
the first condition.
Positions that do comply with this condition are called pluralist. Here the 
premise is that several moral perspectives merit careful consideration. Plural-
ist positions that satisfy the first, but not the second condition we call egali-
tarian. Here the premise is that the existence of several plausible perspectives 
means that no choice can be made, since one (our own) alternative is no bet-
ter, more correct, rational, appropriate, et cetera than any other option. The 
alternative stances, including one’s own, are rated equally valid, hence the 
possibility of rational consideration of moral choices is denied. This scepticist 
position rests on the belief that we cannot be sure which moral stance is true 
and which is false. By accepting no stance one avoids the danger of choosing 
a wrong one. The syncretist position implies willingness not only to consider, 
but also to accept and combine all moral stances. Every stance is regarded as 
part of a greater truth. Again no choice is made among moral stances, hence 
the second condition is not satisfied.
But there are pluralist positions that do satisfy the second condition by 
choosing a particular stance. These positions we call preferential. There are 
two possible variants. A relativist position means that after considering all 
moral alternatives, only one is accepted, but the choice is not based on rational 
grounds. It is a matter of individual psychology (taste, custom, etc.) or out-
side influences (education, group conformity, social ideology, etc.). The vari-
ous moral alternatives are seen as equally rational. Acceptance of one of them 
“emerges from considerations that themselves lack any rational basis — as a 
matter of taste, of personal inclination, or social tradition etc.” (Rescher 
1993, 80). One learns to justify one’s choice by citing a particular culture and 
tradition. A contextualist position implies that a chosen moral stance merits 
acceptance. In this case the criterion is the rationality of the stance on the 
basis of universally valid criteria. Both the relativist and contextualist posi-
tions are preferentially pluralist. Thus they satisfy the first two conditions: 
they acknowledge a diversity of plausible moral stances (1), and that one 
must not only consider them all, but must choose a particular stance and 
commit oneself to it (2). But only a contextualist position satisfies the third 
condition of justifying one’s choice.3 (Rescher 1993, 64-126). This classifica-
tion is summarised in Figure 1:
3 It does not mean that the position I find most rational is the one others have to accept, or 
that the other’s position is less rational. Rescher (1993, 101) writes: “[The] insistence on the 
correctness of one particular alternative is perfectly compatible with a pluralism that acknowl-
edges that others, situated differently from ourselves in the experiential scheme of things, may 
be fully rationally warranted and entitled to hold the variant position they in fact adopt.”
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Figure 1: Typology of possible positions on moral pluralism
plausible* acceptable** choice possible choice rational position
0 0 – nihilism
1 1 – monism
several 0 no (egalitarian) – scepticist pluralism
several several no (egalitarian) – syncretist pluralism 
several 1 yes (preferential) no relativist pluralism 
several 1 yes (preferential) yes contextualist pluralism 
 * plausible in the sense of deserving sympathetic consideration (Rescher 1993, 98).
** acceptable in the sense of deserving endorsement and adoption (Rescher 1993, 98).
3. Goals of Moral Education
In this section we use Rescher’s typology to classify the various goals of moral 
education encountered in the literature. This enables us to identify six types 
of goals relating to handling moral pluralism. The foregoing figure (Figure 1) 
shows the dimensions where they differ from each other. First we locate 
the goals of moral education in the framework of the typology, then we 
 indicate in which approaches to Christian adult education the goals occur. 
What we provide is a rational reconstruction rather than a historical descrip-
tion or an analysis of certain authors in the field. The goals are represented 
only insofar as they fit the typology conceptually. We do not profess to give a 
historical or systematic overview of all authors in the field of moral educa-
tion. Those that are mentioned in the outline below merely serve to illustrate 
a particular type.
The names of the various types of goals derive from the typology, with the 
exception of the nihilistic position. That is because the term ‘nihilist’ in the 
context of moral education may cause confusion. To avoid misunderstanding 
we opt for the term ‘universal non-moralist’, which is more apposite to the 
contents of this goal than the term ‘nihilist’, since it is not a case of partici-
pants claiming that no moral position is worth considering, but rather that 
such consideration is pointless at a social level.
3.1 Universal Non-Moralist Goal of Moral Education
The universal non-moralist position implies that participants realize that moral 
arguments no longer play a role in social life. On the basis of the  pluralist 
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character of society, they are taught to renounce the question of adopting 
moral positions. The pluralism of society obstructs the achievement of broad 
— substantive — consensus on moral issues. Such a broad, substantive moral-
ity, which comprises elements from tradition, intuitions that cannot be sub-
stantiated and worldview-related arguments, can never be universally endorsed 
(Zwart 1993, 103). In moral counseling, therefore, we should not make use of 
such worldview-informed justifications, since they do not convince others. In 
public life, after all, moral deliberation is aimed at consensus, not at truth. In 
fact, the various moral positions should not be considered at a societal level, 
since they merely cause conflict. Not that morality as such should be thrown 
overboard; but moral considerations should be confined to the domain of 
personal morality (Zwart 1993, 69-109).4 Everybody should work out for 
themselves where they stand. Moral authority lies with the individual person.
Such a goal of moral education is found in the ‘worldview-related’ 
approach to Christian adult education. At a social level modernization has 
put pressure on the integrative function of worldview-related institutions. 
This applies not only to Christianity as a specific worldview but to world-
view-related approaches generally. Individuals no longer have shared customs, 
symbols and narratives of a consistent worldview at their disposal (Zwart 
1993, 29-94).5 Worldview-related education requires critical acknowledg-
ment of the gap left by religion in its institutional manifestation. This gap 
now provides a space for individual identity construction.6
3.2 Monist Goal of Moral Education
The monist type regards moral education as initiation into the Christian 
 tradition without putting it against the background of other traditions. 
4 Zwart also describes criticism levelled at this approach. One could argue that it is quite 
impossible not to invoke broad moral perspectives. Every justificatory practice is inescapably 
bound to tradition (MacIntyre) and our commitment to such a practice relates directly to 
acceptance or rejection of certain arguments. Indeed, the origin and location in the worldview-
related tradition of the arguments used have to be traced. Refraining from citing substantive 
considerations is not only impossible but also undesirable. One emphatically has to draw on 
personal morality, especially when dealing with different backgrounds. If not, the diversity is 
camouflaged so as to avoid or manage conflict. Pluralism, although ostensibly accepted, is in 
fact neutralised (Zwart 1993, 181-248). 
5 In this regard Kunneman refers to the demolition of the ‘tea-cosy culture’, the concomitant 
of the modernisation and rationalisation processes. Kunneman 1996, 15 (our translation): “Indi-
viduals no longer shelter largely under the tea cosy of the ‘pillar’, worldview or political move-
ment to which they belong, but engage in a process of worldview-related individualisation.” 
6 This development is a concomitant of the modernization processes of rationalization, dif-
ferentiation and segmentation. T. Geurts, following Habermas, works out these concepts from 
the perspective of sociology of knowledge. For a detailed exposition see Geurts 1997, 32-97.
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One could regard this as religious and moral exclusivism, for the alternatives 
are left out of consideration:
Generally, it [exclusivism] makes the questionable assumption that only one out 
of a possible range of versions of religious truth is valid, without an adequate 
exploration of the alternatives (Hobson & Edwards 1999, 48-49).
Christian adult educators who pursue the monist goal want participants to 
appropriate the values of the Christian tradition. An example is the transmis-
sion of values. The question of what values to transmit is left unasked. The 
typical assumption is that the values to be transmitted are predetermined. 
Thus the contents of education are decided in advance. The premise is the 
values, not the participants’ preferences:
. . . ultimately the deciding factor is not the value system functioning in the biog-
raphy of the educand (our translation, Van der Ven 1985, 40).
The aim is decidedly not that participants should evaluate the transmitted 
values critically or learn to make moral choices for themselves (Van der Ven 
1998, 125-136).
In Christian adult education the monist goal is found in what is known 
as kerugmatic catechesis — which centers on personal surrender to Jesus 
Christ — and neo-scholastic catechesis, which focuses on constructing a 
Christian identity, evidenced by appropriation of ecclesiastic doctrine.7
3.3 Scepticist Pluralist Goal of Moral Education
A scepticist position means that, although participants are expected to con-
sider different moral preferences, they in fact accept none of them because 
the choice cannot be substantiated.
Inculcation of moral feelings — also known as emotional education — fits 
into this type of goal.8 In terms of cognitive interaction theory emotions are 
formed in interaction with the context and play a major role in cognitive 
evaluation. In the absence of an external criterion, emotions should be classi-
fied according to their contribution to the evaluation process. For the purpose 
7 For a detailed exposition of kerugmatik and neo-scholastic catechesis in the Netherlands, 
see Hemel 1986, 78-94; Van der Ven 1982, 380-382 and De Jong 2002, 39-57.
8 It is noteworthy that J. Wilson adduces the existence of a ‘moral sense’ as counter argu-
ment to a sceptical view of moral education. Human beings have “an intuitive or directly 
 experienced felt belief about how one ought to act when one is free to act voluntarily”, which 
forms the basis for their moral judgments. Examples of this moral sense are such moral concep-
tions as sympathy, honesty, self-control and duty (Wilson 1993, vii-26, xii).
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of such classification Van der Ven proposes the criterion of authenticity, which 
is met by emotions like empathy and a sense of justice. The aim of instilling 
moral feelings is that participants learn to develop their moral sensibility and 
to reinforce feelings (such as moral indignation) (Van der Ven 1998, 283-
337). Emotional education is not aimed at moral decision making but at the 
evaluation process, whose outcome or moral content is not predetermined. In 
this approach the aim is to reinforce moral feelings. Morality influences behav-
iour but is not focal in moral decision making. The focus of emotional educa-
tion is not moral choices but moral feelings. One has to learn that various 
moral positions merit consideration. For that reason emotional education is 
an example of pluralist moral education, although it does not (yet) entail 
actively opting for a moral position. That is why it is called a scepticist goal.
In Christian adult education such a goal of moral education may feature, for 
example, in existential catechesis. Here the aim is to establish a religious iden-
tity by way of existential clarification. The assumption is that immersing one-
self in one’s existential experience affords insight into its religious dimension. 
Emotional education is a key component of such existential clarification.9
3.4 Syncretist Pluralist Goal of Moral Education
A syncretist goal is when Christian adult educators want participants to con-
sider and adopt several moral positions. An example of such a goal is value 
clarification, developed by Raths, Harmin and Simon in the 1960s and 
1970s. Value clarification is meant to offer an alternative to traditional goals 
of moral education such as value transmission, which no longer suffices in a 
pluralist age (Cf. Van der Ven 1985, 57). The situation of moral pluralism 
and the declining influence of the church, the family, et cetera have left peo-
ple confused, insecure or unclear about their moral position. The aim of value 
clarification is to make individuals realise what they do and do not value and 
to act accordingly.10 Moral pluralism implies that moral positions cannot and 
should not be predetermined. Participants are helped to become aware and 
develop their own moral preferences. Individuals opt freely for a position 
after considering the implications of alternative stances (Van der Ven 1985, 
42-44). The hallmark of value clarification is that the accent is not so much 
on the values as on the participants’ evaluation process — not so much on 
what their moral preferences are as on how they arrive at them. Moral prefer-
ences are neither true nor false, but are products of personal experience. One 
 9 The goals of existential catechesis are discussed in Van der Ven 1982; De Jong 2002, 
39-57 and De Jong & Zondag 1998, 27-37.
10 Here we deal mainly with the awareness aspect of value clarification. The concomitant 
feelings, which also need clarifying, are not discussed. 
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cannot prescribe a preference or dictate which preferences are acceptable. 
Hence this goal rejects an external moral authority. Individuals decide for 
themselves what preference they develop for which values.
Value clarification accords with a syncretist goal, firstly because it satisfies 
the condition of considering several moral preferences. Considering moral 
alternatives is a cardinal criterion of value clarification (Raths et all 1966, 
27-48), which makes it an example of a pluralist goal. Secondly, value clarifi-
cation is egalitarian in that no moral choice is involved. It does not entail 
judgment of whether preferences are good or bad; the individual’s preference 
is accepted. The various moral positions are not only considered but are also 
accepted. That makes value clarification an example of a syncretist goal.
Value clarification is used mainly in mystagogic adult education, which 
sensitizes participants to the religious images hidden in human beings.11
3.5 Relativist Pluralist Aim of Moral Education
A relativist goal of moral education implies that educands learn to opt for a 
particular moral stance against a morally pluralist background. The existence 
of other moral preferences is acknowledged, but the choice is based on the 
preferences of their own tradition. Since from a rational point of view moral 
preferences cannot be judged, educands are taught to choose on the basis of 
agreement with a given tradition. That is why it is called a relativist goal of 
moral education. Participants are taught to adopt the values of the Christian 
tradition.
We find this goal among proponents of Christian (virtue)ethics such as the 
moral theologian Stanley Hauerwas. Here tradition and the community are 
the premise of Christian adult education. A community embodies the stories 
and rituals of such a tradition. To live morally one needs a community in 
which the tradition is transmitted, and “the Christian word for that commu-
nity is church” (Hauerwas 1983, 33). Any pretensions to moral autonomy 
have to be abandoned for the sake of membership of such a community 
(Hauerwas 1983, 16-43).12
A relativist goal of moral education takes full cognisance of moral pluralism. 
In contrast to the monist goal, participants have to choose between various 
moral alternatives. Hence it is a preferential approach to moral pluralism. It is 
relativist because the choice is rationally indifferent. This implies that our 
moral preferences cannot be justified by a universally valid rational viewpoint. 
11 For more information on mystagogic catechesis, see Van den Berk 1999, 50-63; 1998, 
111-124 and De Jong 2002.
12 A. Dillen (2005) assesses Hauerwas’s model as a one-sided initiation and socialisation 
model that does not allow sufficiently for the critical, constructive input in the community and 
tradition of the individual’s (in this case, child’s) own ability to assign meaning.
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Agreement with arguments is necessarily in terms of a particular moral 
tradition:
To say more about morality requires not simply a conception of the good, but a 
tradition that carries the virtues necessary for training in movement toward the 
good (Hauerwas 1983, 35).
We call this a relativist goal because, after due consideration of the alternatives, 
participants opt for a moral position that accords with their own tradition.
3.6 Contextualist Pluralist Goal of Moral Education
When pursuing a contextualist goal of moral education the point of  departure 
is a universally valid, rational criterion, by means of which educands must 
learn to choose between different moral stances. Within this category we dis-
tinguish between two types of goals because of the criteria of  rationality used. 
The criterion for the first type is the quality of the moral actions (virtues), 
and for the second type it is the quality of the moral judgments. We call the 
two types character formation and moral communication respectively.
The goal the first type is character formation. Lickona defines character 
formation as “the intentional, proactive effort to develop good character” 
(Lickona 1997, 46), where good character consists in possession of virtues. 
Classical virtues like fairness and prudence are regarded as objectively good 
human qualities, beneficial to the individual and the community alike.13 
Character formation entails a non-relativist attitude towards moral values: 
“There are rationally grounded, nonrelative, objectively worthwhile moral 
values” (Lickona 1991, 230). These values provide the moral substance that 
defines good character. Van der Ven’s definition of character formation waters 
down the universal pretension somewhat. In his view character formation 
implies classical virtue ethics reinterpreted in light of the Enlightenment, 
modernization and moral pluralism (Van der Ven 1998, 339-387).14 One 
strategy for character formation is ethical reflection. By learning what the vir-
tues are and what they require from us in real-life situations learners are ena-
13 Peterson and Seligman’s attempt to classify the components of a ‘good character’ could 
also be included in this approach. They maintain that people’s notions of goodness vary, but 
that there are six categories of ‘core virtues’ that have been accepted in all cultures through the 
ages: wisdom, courage, humaneness, justice, moderation and transcendence. Here, too, we find 
that the goal of character building is linked to universal pretensions (Peterson & Seligman 
2004, 3-16). 
14 The reinterpretation is inspired by Ricoeur and implies that it is not premised on univer-
sally valid virtues, but that one has to work out inductively which virtues are appropriate in a 
given context. 
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bled to reason morally and take corresponding decisions (Van der Ven 1998, 
55, Cf, Lockwood 1997, 174-185).
The second type of contextualist goal entails value communication. The 
rational criterion of choice between moral preferences is the argumentative 
quality of the communication. The aim is not to transmit moral preferences 
but learn how to argue in order to arrive at a morally sound decision. Partici-
pants learn to make such decisions (in each particular case) by way of moral 
argumentation. Van der Ven defines value communication as developing the 
skill of dealing with conflicting moral preferences. It consists in willingness 
to transpose oneself to different perspectives (i.e. exchanging perspectives). 
This means that one tries to adopt the other party’s perspective so as to 
understand his or her assumptions and premises. If the other does the same, 
the outcome is mutual understanding of convictions, values and feelings (Van 
der Ven 1992). But it does not stop at subjective evaluation of moral prefer-
ences; their ethical quality is also pertinent. That is why the criterion of 
accepting a moral preference does not lie in the subjective processes but in 
communicative reasoning. These arguments are used to evaluate moral pref-
erences and decide which one deserves to be passed on. The authority is not 
convention or a charismatic leader; argumentative reason is the sole author-
ity. Every point of view can be presented, every value considered, but the 
only moral preferences that pass the test are those that are rationally defensi-
ble (Van der Ven 1985, 29-39, 51).15
Character formation and value communication are important in critical 
catechesis. With the aid of critical theological insights participants learn to 
contemplate the religious dimension independently (also see Van der Ven 
1982, 401-425, 378; De Jong 1998, 137-151; De Jong and Zondag 1998, 
27-37). Participatory adult education likewise sets a contextualist goal for 
moral education. Religion is seen as religious practices embedded in praxis 
communities. Only by participating in religious practices like Bible reading or 
religiously inspired social engagement does one gain insight into the meaning 
of religion and only then does one develop a religious and moral identity 
(Hermans 2002; Hermans 2003).
3.7 Research Questions
Having described the six types of goals for moral education, we proceed to 
formulate the following research questions:
15 Another example of this form of contextualist moral education is Kohlberg’s concept of 
moral development. The highest level of moral development is the sixth, ‘post-conventional’ 
stage, when the person no longer acquires specific values but refers to the underlying universal 
moral principles that need to be determined rationally. Cf. Van der Ven 1998, 181-234.
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1. What goals of moral education are recognised by Christian adult  educators?
2. To what extent do they agree with these goals?
3. How do the goals correlate?
4. Who are the social carriers of the various goals?
4. Empirical Research
4.1 Research Questions
We formulate the following research questions of our research:
1. What goals of moral education are recognised by Christian adult 
educators?
2. To what extent do they agree with these goals?
3. How do the goals correlate?
4. Who are the social carriers of the various goals?
4.2 Sample
Our empirical research  was conducted among adult catechists and counselors 
working in a Catholic context in the Netherlands, namely:
• Adult catechists in parishes
• Pastors charged with adult religious education
• Counselors at religious counseling and meditation centers
• Teachers at pastoral schools16
• Theologically trained volunteers experienced in Christian adult education
The population comprised about 500, each of whom received a questionnaire. 
A total of 151 completed questionnaires were returned, amounting to a 
response rate of some 30%.
4.3 Measuring Instruments
Our research questions pertain to the types of goals of moral education for 
adults presented in the theoretical section. To make these goals measurable we 
used indicators of facets that distinguish one goal from another. The reader is 
referred to Figure 1, which summarises possible stances on moral pluralism.
16 A pastoral school is usually a two-year training course for parish volunteers. 
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Figure 2: Overview of indicators of types of goals of moral education
how many 
plausible
how many 
acceptable
goal 
universal non-
moralistic
no moral 
position considered
no moral position 
accepted
awareness that moral 
considerations play no 
role in society
monistic one moral 
position considered
one moral 
position accepted
adopt Christian moral 
position 
scepticist several moral 
positions considered
several moral 
positions accepted
reinforce moral feelings 
syncretist several moral 
positions considered
several moral 
positions accepted
clarify own moral 
position
relativist several moral 
positions considered
one moral position 
accepted
develop preference 
for moral position 
corresponding with 
Christian culture 
contextualist several moral 
positions considered
one moral position 
accepted
learn to choose the right 
moral position through 
moral argumentation
On the basis of these indicators we operationalised each goal by means of 
items. In the questionnaire the items were provided with a Likert scale17 and 
submitted to the Christian adult educators. An example of an item meant to 
measure a monist goal is the following: “Participants adopt values that con-
form to the Christian tradition.” The following item is meant to measure a 
contextualist goal: “Participants learn to choose between values on the basis of 
morally sound arguments.” In the appendix, we have included the measuring 
instruments for the independent variables.
5. Results
The first research question about Christian adult educators’ goals for moral 
education we answered by means of factor analysis. Responses were subjected 
to factor analysis to reveal the interrelationship between items. Our assump-
tion was that interrelationships between items stem from underlying factors 
that are not directly observable. Factor analysis is a dimensional technique for 
17 They range from 1 (disagree totally) to 5 (totally agree). 
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Table 1: Oblimin rotated factor matrix, commonality (h²) and percentage 
explained variance in regard to goals of moral education18
item h² f1 f2 f3
participants learn to appreciate that values do not really 
feature in public life
.65 .78 –.21
participants will realise that values have hardly any 
influence in public life these days
.52 .72
participants adopt Christian values .70 .83
participants adopt values that accord with the Christian 
tradition 
.68 .82
participants learn to choose from the totality of moral 
values those that accord with our Christian culture 
.63 .79
from the multiplicity of values participants develop a 
preference for those that prevail in our Christian culture 
.61 .77
participants learn to make sound moral decisions after 
evaluating diverse moral values 
.65 .79
participants learn to choose among different values on the 
basis of sound argumentation 
.55 .73
participants learn to clarify their own moral values .57 –.23 .69
participants learn to enhance their moral sensibility .55 –.29 .67
participants become aware of their moral values .62 –.40 .67
participants learn to consider what the right moral 
behaviour is in each situation 
.42 .63
participants learn to make proper moral choices in real-
life situations 
.38 .24 .57
explained variance  57,9 %
Factor loadings below .20 were left out
Legend:
f1 = universal non-moralist goal of moral education
f2 = preferential monist goal of moral education
f3 = deliberative pluralist goal of moral education
tracing such latent, non-observable factors. For our purpose we chose free fac-
tor analysis, implying that clustering of items is directed by the Christian adult 
educators thinking. The result of this analysis is shown in Table 1.
Our theoretical framework led us to expect six factors, but the analysis 
yielded only three, which we labelled ‘universal non-moralist goal’, ‘preferen-
tial monist goal’ and ‘deliberative pluralist goal’. Figure 3 illustrates the differ-
ence between the theoretical and empirical domains.19
18 One item was removed because of excessively low commonality. It falls under the scepti-
cist goal of moral education and reads: “Participants develop a sense of moral indignation.” 
19 For ease of reference this figure deviates from the sequence in the preceding tables, in that 
the preferential variant of pluralist education appears above the egalitarian variant. 
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Figure 3: Relation between theoretical and empirical domains regarding types of 
goals of moral education
The squares in the first column (theoretical domain) contain the six theoreti-
cal concepts in our typology of goals of moral education. The squares in the 
second column (empirical domain) contain the three factors yielded by our 
analysis. The first factor corresponds exactly with the concept of a universal 
non-moralist goal of moral education. The second factor comprises items 
from two theoretical scales — the monist and relativist pluralist goals of 
moral education. The common denominator between these goals is that both 
entail opting for a particular moral preference. Clearly educators do not dif-
ferentiate whether their choice of a goal entails consideration of alternatives 
(relativist) or not (monist). Since in both instances it is ultimately a choice of 
just one moral preference, we label the factor ‘preferential monist goal’. The 
third factor is a hybrid of the remaining forms of pluralist goals, comprising 
items from the contextualist, scepticist and syncretist goals of moral education. 
 Theoretical domain Empirical domain
universal non-
moralist goal 
monist goal 
relativist 
luralist goal  
contextualist 
pluralist goal
scepticist 
pluralist goal
syncretist 
pluralist goal
universal non-
moralist goal 
preferential 
monist goal
deliberative 
pluralist goal
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Table 2: Reliability of scales of types of goals of moral education (N=149)
Goal items alpha
universal non-moralist goal 2 .75
preferential monist goal 4 .88
deliberative pluralist goal 7 .86
Table 3: Mean scale scores and standard deviation (s.d.) of types of goals of 
moral education (N=149)
Goal mean s.d.
universal non-moralist goal 1.7 .74
preferential monist goal 3.3 .79
deliberative pluralist goal 4.1 .55
On the basis of the common denominator among the three goals — that is, 
consideration of several moral preferences — we call this factor the delibera-
tive pluralist goal. In the theoretical section we identified three types of plu-
ralist goals, but in the empirical domain we found that adult educators do 
not distinguish between them, hence we label it ‘deliberative pluralist goal’. 
In the concluding section we return to this point.
To sum up, Christian adult educators identify three goals of adult moral 
education: an universal non-moralist goal, a preferential monist and a delib-
erative pluralist goal. Table 2 shows the three scales and their reliability.
The table reflects high values. The reliability of a scale tells us something 
about the correlation of the items. A low correlation indicates that it is sheer 
chance that the items relate in this manner. The higher the reliability of the 
scale, the stronger the correlation between items.
The second research question concerns the extent to which Christian adult 
educators agree with the goals of moral education. The answer to the ques-
tion appears in Table 3.
As is evident in the table, Christian adult educators agree least with an uni-
versal non-moralist goal. The mean scale score of 1.7 implies rejection of this 
goal. Agreement with a preferential monist goal is significantly higher (3.3). 
Although this score falls in the area of ambivalence (2.6-3.4), it manifestly 
inclines to agreement. The deliberative pluralist goal scores the highest agree-
ment (4.1). The high mean scale score implies that adult catechists  concur 
with a deliberative pluralist goal entailing consideration of several moral alter-
natives. As for the spread of individual scores within the mean scale score (see 
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standard deviation), dispersion is widest in the case of goals that are accorded 
least agreement: the universal non-moralist goal (.74) and the  preferential 
monist goal (.79). The deliberative pluralist goal has a noticeably lower disper-
sion (.55). It means that the educators collectively disagree less with the delib-
erative pluralist goal than with the universal non-moralist and preferential 
monist goals. Not only do they agree most with the deliberative pluralist goal, 
but there is also greater consensus among them.
To answer the third research question we turn to relevant (r >.20) and sig-
nificant (p > 0.01) correlations between the various types of goals. We find 
only one significant correlation — the weak negative correlation between the 
universal non-moralist and deliberative pluralist goals of moral education 
(r -.25). It means that the less the counselors agree with the statement that 
no moral position need be considered and accepted (universal non-moralist), 
the more they agree with the statement that all values should be considered 
(deliberative pluralist). This negative correlation accords with the logic of our 
typology. The preferential monist goal does not correlate with the other two 
goals.
The question about the social carriers of the various goals of moral educa-
tion is answered by determining whether differential agreement with the 
goals correlates with certain aspects of the religious institutional beliefs and 
practices of Christian adult educators. We chose beliefs and practices that we 
expected to relate to agreement with the various types of goals.20 The educa-
tors work in the institutional context of the church, either as catechists or 
parish pastors, or as counselors at church affiliated centers. We thought that 
attitudes towards doctrinal authority would affect agreement with the various 
goals of moral education, so we choose the believing aspects of concept of the 
church and conformity with ecclesiastic policy . As acting aspects we choose 
different forms of spirituality. Daily prayer plays a major role in ecclesiasti-
cally defined spirituality (intra-institutional). A focus on mystical experience 
and alternative beliefs indicates a less institutionally oriented form of spiritu-
ality (extra-institutional).
Table 4 shows the correlations between these aspects and agreement with 
the goals of moral education.
20 Questions about these characteristics are included in our questionnaire. See Appendix for 
the instruments used to measure the the religious institutional beliefs and practices of Christian 
adult educators. 
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Table 4: Relevant (>.20) and significant* correlations (Pearsons r) between edu-
cators’ religious institutional beliefs and practices and types of goals of moral 
education
universal non-
moralist
preferential monist deliberative pluralist
centralised decision making .40** –.31**
conformity with ecclesiastic 
policy 
.40**
prayer .41**
mystical experience –.35** .30**
alternative beliefs .27**
* p < 0.01 ** p < 0.001
We observe that agreement or disagreement with the universal non-moralist 
goal is not associated with any profile, that is, it does not correlate with edu-
cators’ religious institutional beliefs and practices. Rejection of this goal is 
spread throughout the sample rather than confined to a particular group. 
Agreement with the preferential monist and deliberative pluralist goals, how-
ever, is greatly influenced by educators’ religious institutional beliefs and 
practices. The table shows that agreement with a preferential monist goal of 
moral education implies agreement with a hierarchic conception of a cen-
trally administered church (r .40). In addition educators who subscribe to a 
preferential monist goal are more inclined to observe official ecclesiastic pol-
icy (r .40), pray more regularly (r .41) and report fewer mystical experiences 
(r -.35).
Educators who agree with a deliberative pluralist goal also have a distinc-
tive ecclesiastic profile. Those who endorse this goal reject centralised deci-
sion making within the church (r -.31), and at the level of acting they report 
more mystical experiences (r .30) and greater interest in themes of alternative 
beliefs (r .27). In fact, these educators are roughly the reverse of those who 
agree with a preferential monist goal.
6. Summary and Discussion
What are the principal conclusions of the empirical data on goals of moral 
education? We briefly recapitulate the results with reference to the four 
research questions, whereupon we take a closer look at some remarkable find-
ings and raise some policy issues emanating from these findings.
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The research data reveal that Christian adult educators discern three types of 
goals of moral education: a universal non-moralist, a preferential monist and a 
deliberative pluralist goal. Remarkably, in their minds a monist goal is linked to 
a relativist (pluralist) goal. A relativist pluralist goal entails the choice of a spe-
cific moral position (here a Christian one). Although several moral positions are 
considered, ultimately only one of these is deemed acceptable. A monist goal 
corresponds with this relativist pluralist perspective inasmuch as only one moral 
position is acceptable, but it differs in that only one position is considered.
How should one interpret this link between monist and relativist pluralist 
goals? It seems to suggest that the choice of a moral position in a pluralist 
society presupposes awareness of moral pluralism. Following the sociologist 
of religion Peter Berger one could call it the ‘tragedy of orthodoxy’. In his 
view the modern world is characterised by the ‘heretical imperative’ to choose 
(Berger 1979). In an age of religious pluralism the multiplicity of ideas and 
lifestyles makes people aware of the existence of alternative lifestyles and tra-
ditions.21 Not only is it possible to choose between them, it has even become 
imperative:
Modernity multiplies choices and concomitantly reduces the scope of what is 
experienced as destiny. In the matter of religion, as indeed in other areas of 
human life and thought, this means that the modern individual is faced not just 
with the opportunity but with the necessity to make choices as to his beliefs 
(Berger 1979, 30).
The realisation that one chooses a particular tradition means that it is no 
longer taken for granted that the Christian tradition is the only plausible 
option (as in monism). That is the ‘tragedy of orthodoxy’; “The orthodox 
must then present to himself as fate what he knows empirically to be a 
choice” (Berger 1979, 30). In a pluralist age even orthodox believers realize 
that their religious beliefs are ultimately a matter of choice (Berger 1979, 
11-31, 60-65; Cf. Berger 1967). Even though the educators’ aim is that par-
ticipants should opt for one particular moral preference, they know full well 
that the choice is made against a background of moral pluralism. All that 
remains is a qualified monism, in the knowledge that one has taken a decision. 
That is why we speak of preferential monism.
21 Berger’s analysis does not apply only to religion but also to morality. Berger 1979, 26: “It 
will be clear by now that religion is by no means the only area of experience and thought 
affected by the transition from fate to choice. Morality, for one, is crucially affected, as are all 
institutions (notably political ones) that lay claim to any kind of moral authority.”
1. 
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Another surprising result is that the deliberative pluralist goal comprehends 
three pluralist goals. They are similar in that all three entail the plausibility of 
diverse moral positions. They differ in that ultimately one accepts none (scep-
ticist), only one (contextualist) or several (syncretist) of these preferences. 
They differ on the availability of criteria that will help one to determine which 
moral position is preferable.
How does one explain the convergence of such differing, mutually exclu-
sive approaches? One explanation is to regard the purpose of moral consider-
ation as a search for moral truth rather than consensus. Striving for consensus 
may obviate conflict, but fundamental contradictions are obscured. Only by 
allowing for dissent does one take proper account of the complexity of the 
moral situation. Substantive disagreement presents a challenge and a reason 
to continue the dialogue. Enforcing consensus may prematurely cut short the 
hermeneutic process of confrontation and search for truth.22 A hermeneutic 
ethical approach to moral pluralism such as that of the ethicist Hub Zwart 
and others puts the accent on the process of moral deliberation rather than 
assent to a particular moral choice. A situation of moral pluralism requires 
maximum deliberation. Although the outcome is still a decision, one is aware 
that it does not conclude the process. The idea is to broaden and deepen the 
process of moral deliberation. Zwart calls it a pluralist imperative, which 
implies readiness to deliberate.23 Deliberation consists in exchanging argu-
ments and critically testing these (Zwart 1993, 261-264; Rescher 1993, 
98-126; Jansen 1994, 55, 84-86).
We do have the ability to weigh up evidence and can be held accountable if we 
do not carry out adequate enquiry before passing judgment, or are not suffi-
ciently concerned to determine rationally the issue one way or the other. [. . .] we 
condemn the political or religious fanatic’s narrowness in not considering all the 
available evidence or for not considering alternative viewpoints (Hobson and 
Edwards 1999, 87).
22 Rescher, too, explicitly objects to approaches to pluralism that aim primarily at reaching 
consensus. Rescher 1993, 3-4: “[. . .] it opposes the aprioristic rationalism inherent in neo-con-
tractarian theory — alike in the idealized communicative contract version promoted in conti-
nental European philosophy by Jürgen Habermas and in the idealized social-contract version of 
the theory of political justice promoted in the Anglo-American context by John Rawls.”
23 In this context reference is made to the ethics of believing. According to Hobson and 
Edwards acceptance of a particular religious belief is accompanied by epistemological obliga-
tions and moral responsibility for the consequences. Everyone is in duty bound to weigh the 
available arguments for their own and other people’s religious beliefs. On the assumption that 
others do the same and that their beliefs are therefore based on sound reasons, we have to 
respect their religious convictions. Hobson & Edwards, 1999, 85-90.
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The combined pluralist goal that we found among the educators may be 
regarded as a form of moral deliberation. That is why we end up by calling it 
the deliberative pluralist goal.
The Christian adult educators agree most with the deliberative pluralist goal. 
The preferential monist goal falls in the area of ambivalence, albeit inclining 
to agreement. The universal non-moralist goal is rejected. The educators 
appear to allow for moral pluralism in the sense that they teach participants to 
consider moral alternatives.
The goal of deliberative pluralism allows most fully for moral argumenta-
tion in a context of diversified moral preferences from different religious and 
nonreligious traditions. Preferential monism, while recognising pluralism, 
considers only one position morally acceptable. The normative correctness of 
one moral position is assumed, so alternative positions are not considered. 
That is where deliberative pluralism pursues the critical argument further, in 
that several positions are taken to be acceptable and are weighed up in critical 
debate. What is ultimately accepted is the upshot of an argued debate on sev-
eral moral positions. The counsellors’ preference for a deliberative pluralist 
goal is a good point of departure for Christian adult education in a pluralist 
society.
The universal non-moralist and deliberative pluralist goals correlate negatively. 
This result concurs with the logical structure of our typology. After all, agree-
ing with the statement that no moral position need be considered precludes 
agreement with the statement that one has to consider several moral positions. 
There is no correlation between the preferential monist goal and the delibera-
tive pluralist goal. On the basis of our typology we anticipated a negative cor-
relation, since it makes a big difference whether only one moral tradition is 
considered acceptable or several. But the monism that emerged from our 
research differs from our theoretical definition of monism. Preferential mon-
ism deems only one position acceptable but several are seen as plausible. It is 
this awareness of moral pluralism that preferential monism and deliberative 
pluralism have in common. In light of this parallel it is understandable that 
the educators do not find the two goals contradictory. In other words, agree-
ment with the deliberative pluralist goal and agreement with the preferential 
monist goal are not mutually exclusive.
Finally we take a look at the connection between the institutional context and 
agreement with the foregoing goals. Educators who subscribe to a preferential 
monist goal show marked signs of a hierarchic concept of the church, are very 
2. 
3. 
4. 
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much guided by official ecclesiastic policy in performing their task, and indi-
cate that they pray more regularly than other educators. These characteristics 
suggest that educators who strongly endorse this goal have a pronounced insti-
tutional profile of submission to authority. Those who show a marked prefer-
ence for deliberative pluralism reject centralised decision making within the 
church and have a more extra-institutional religious profile, being open to 
mystical experience and alternative beliefs. The correlation of the religious 
institutional beliefs and practices of Christian adult educators and agreement 
with the two goals is perfectly understandable. Educators who aspire to have 
only the Christian moral preference considered and accepted will be more 
inclined than educators who pursue a pluralist goal to have their work directed 
by a centralised ecclesiastic doctrinal authority (hierarchic concept of the 
church), and will therefore adhere more strictly to its guidelines.
Deliberative pluralism requires Christians to deal with moral pluralism 
argumentatively. Educators endorsing this goal are acting in a way that is 
characterised by openness to mystical experience and alternative beliefs and 
rejection of centralised decision making within the church.
What does that mean in the context of ecclesiastic politics in the Catholic 
Church in the Netherlands, which sometimes can put great emphasis on sub-
mission to doctrinal authority and leaves less scope for alternative moral ideas? 
Educators with a definite preference for the deliberative pluralist goal will 
clearly find the current ecclesiastic dispensation stressful. There are three pos-
sibilities: they either have to endure the strain; or give up their jobs as religious 
adult educator; or conform to prevailing ecclesiastic policy, which sometimes 
offers little institutional support for a deliberative pluralist goal. The last two 
options have the same result, namely less interest in deliberative pluralist goals 
in Christian adult education. Our research data indicate that a fair group of 
educators are caught in the dilemma. The problem is organizational rather 
than individual. It concerns professionals in a particular institutional context, 
that of the Catholic Church in the Netherlands, who might have difficulties 
to do their work according to their own professional notions. Ecclesiastic pol-
icy makers should at least be prepared to discuss the problem in their capacity 
as good employers, if possible with a deliberative attitude.
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Appendix: Measuring Instruments Aspects of Educators’ Institutional 
Beliefs and Practices
1. Concept of church (believing)
Attitudes towards centralised ecclesiastic decision-making structures were 
measured with an instrument taken from Jeurissen (1993, 154-156, 179). 
The items read as follows:
• Believers should decide for themselves what happens in the church.
• It is not a good thing for believers to co-determine everything that hap-
pens in the church.
• It is not a good idea for every believer to have a hand in ecclesiastic deci-
sions.
• The church is best managed by a few authoritative persons who take 
responsibility for it.
• Responsibility for what happens in the church should not be in the hands 
of a small group of managers.
• Church policy should be laid down by a few responsible managers.
2. Conformity with ecclesiastic policy (believing)
Educators’ conformity with ecclesiastic policy was measured by asking them 
whether and to what extent they are guided by the following in case of differ-
ences about catechetical contents:
• Guidelines of diocesan church authorities
• Policy directives of their institution/deanery/parish
• Agreements with colleagues
3. Prayer (acting, intra-institutional)
Prayer patterns were measured by asking them how often they pray.
4. Mystical experience (acting, extra-institutional)
Mystical experience was measured by asking whether and how often educa-
tors have had the following experiences:
• Have you ever had a sense of union with all things?
• Have you ever had an experience in which time and space ceased to 
exist?
• Have you ever had an experience that you would call sacred?
• Have you ever had a feeling that everything is perfect?
• Have you ever had an experience that left you with a feeling of wonderment?
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5. Alternative religiosity (acting, extra-institutional)
Alternative religiosity was measured by asking which of following alternative 
topics educators read about in books or journals, or learn about in lectures:
 mysticism  shamanism  gnosticism
 esoterics  alternative medicine  Taoism
 teachers/gurus  runes  theosophy
 astrology  numerology  new scientific paradigms
 I-Ching  yoga  New Age
 Tarot  anthroposophy  tantra
 course of miracles  holistic medicine   the Celestine Prophecy
 Buddhism  Hinduism  Osho / Baghwan
